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Background  
This Cardiff University study of religious courts and tribunals across the UK has been funded 
by the AHRC/ESRC Religion and Society Programme.  The project, „Social Cohesion and 
Civil Law: Marriage, Divorce and Religious Courts‟, explores how religious law functions 
alongside civil law in England and Wales.  
 
The context, though not the catalyst, for our study, is the lecture given by the Archbishop of 
Canterbury in 2008 on the relationship between religious law - primarily though not 
exclusively Islamic – and civil law in England and Wales.1 In that lecture, Rowan Williams 
sought  to bring to a higher level of public debate than the tabloid press to the question of 
„what it is like to live under more than one (legal) jurisdiction‟ and how (and how far) the 
civil law of the land should recognise or accommodate a legal pluralism based on religious 
adherence. 
 
Part –perhaps much – of the public outcry which greeted the Archbishop‟s lecture in 2008 
reflected a lack of knowledge of how religious courts already operate in this country. Media-
hyped fears over the operation of shariah courts were matched with prejudiced comments 
about the privileging of Jewish courts which have indeed operated in this country for over a 
hundred years. And no one mentioned that the Roman Catholic Church has handed down 
decrees of nullity of marriage throughout its history. So our project explores how religious 
law already functions alongside civil law in England and Wales. The simple aim of our study 
was:  
„to collect information on the role and practice of religious courts in England and 
Wales in order to contribute to debate concerning the extent to which English law 
should accommodate religious legal systems‟. 
 
Our more detailed objectives were to:  
 
1. Survey the existence, organisational structure and legal status of religious courts and 
tribunals across the UK in with detailed examination of three selected institutions (the 
Catholic National Tribunal for Wales in Cardiff; the Jewish London Beth Din, Family 
Division; and the Shariah Council of the Birmingham Central Mosque);  
                                                 
1
 R Williams, „Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious Perspective‟ 7 February 2008, reprinted in 
(2008) 10 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 262.  
6 
 
 
2. Explore the jurisdiction each of these tribunals has in relation to marriage, divorce and 
remarriage and how this is administered and enforced, by reference to the decisions 
made by the bodies and the experience and views of court personnel; 
 
3. Evaluate whether this jurisdiction (and its use) is compatible with civil law in the UK 
and anticipate future trends; 
 
4. Develop a dialogue with the studied institutions in order to pave the way for further 
interdisciplinary research; and finally, 
 
5. Contribute to wider national and international discussion as to the relationship 
between religious and civil law, through the production of outputs disseminating the 
research among a range of specialist and non-specialist audiences. 
 
This document brings together three documents which have previously been published on our 
website: http://www.law.cf.ac.uk/clr/research/cohesion The first part examines the legal 
status of religious courts and tribunals under English law. The second part examines the 
existence of religious courts in general in the UK and the organisational structure of the 
selected Jewish, Christian and Islamic institutions in particular.  The third part sets out the 
key findings from the research. 
 
 
 
 
Professor Gillian Douglas 
Professor Norman Doe 
Dr Sophie Gilliat-Ray 
Dr Russell Sandberg 
Asma Khan  
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Part One: The Regulation of Religion and Religious Law in England and 
Wales  
 
Introduction  
Part one of this Commentary falls into four sections. The first section provides a general 
overview of how English law regulates religion. The second section discusses how religious 
law is recognised under English law whilst the third section focuses upon the recognition of 
religious family law, the object of our study.  The fourth section examines how religious 
courts are recognised under English law, with particular reference to the Arbitration Act 
1996.   
 
The Regulation of Religion in England and Wales  
Unlike many European countries,
2
 English law does not include detailed registration schemes 
for religious groups.  However, this does not mean that religion is not regulated.  Although 
registration is not compulsory under English law, a multitude of overlapping laws have been 
enacted to recognise and regulate both religious groups and religious individuals enabling 
them to benefit from legal and fiscal advantages. 
 
Religious Groups  
The constitutional position of religion differs in the divergent nations of the United 
Kingdom.
3
  Formerly in all four nations there were established churches.  However, 
legislation disestablishing the national church has been enacted in respect of Ireland and 
Wales.
4
  There are two different established churches in England and Scotland respectively: 
the Church of England is an Episcopal Anglican Church; the Church of Scotland is 
Presbyterian.   
 
This commentary focuses upon the law of England and Wales.  It will focus upon the legal 
status of religious groups other than the Church of England.
5
   By dint of its established 
                                                 
2
 See L Friedner (ed), Churches and Other Religious Organisations as Legal Persons (Peeters, 2007). 
3
  The following draws upon M Hill, R Sandberg and N Doe, Religion Law: United Kingdom (Kluwer Law 
International, International Encyclopaedia of Laws Series 2010) para 107 et seq. 
4
 Irish Church Act 1869; Welsh Church Act 1914. 
5
 On which see M Hill, Ecclesiastical Law (3
rd
 edition, Oxford University Press, 2007) and N Doe, The Legal 
Framework of the Church of England (Oxford University Press 1996). 
8 
 
status, the law of the Church of England is part of the general law of England.
6
  Pieces of 
Church law – called Measures – are created by a religious body (the General Synod of the 
Church of England) but are then considered by the Ecclesiastical Committee of Parliament.  
Once given Royal Assent they have the same effect as an Act of Parliament.
7
   The legal 
status of the disestablished Church in Wales also differs from other religious groups: 
although it shares many features with all other religious groups, it continues to share some 
features with the Church of England, especially in relation to the regulation of rites of 
passage.
8
  
 
Since toleration, religious groups other than the Church of England have been lawful and 
allowed to practise their religion.
9
  There are several legal mechanisms which require 
religious groups to register to acquire a certain legal status, most notably in the form of 
registration as a place of religious worship
10
 and for the solemnisation of marriage.
11
   
Religious groups may seek to register as a charity for the advancement of religion.
12
  Such 
registration typically enables religious groups to achieve fiscal advantages.   
 
Regardless of registration status, all religious groups are usually treated as voluntary 
associations.
13
   The relationship of members as between themselves is governed by quasi-
contract and the organisations are treated as a matter of law as members of clubs or 
unincorporated associations.  These exist where two or more people are voluntarily bound 
together for common purposes and undertake mutual duties and obligations.  Unincorporated 
associations have no legal personality distinct from their members (unlike a corporation): 
they cannot sue or be sued and cannot hold property (though institutions within them may be 
legal owners of property if they have the status of corporations or trustees). Religious 
voluntary associations seeking legal personality can form as a limited company. 
 
                                                 
6
 Mackonochie v Lord Penzance (1881) 6 App Cas 424. 
7
 Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act 1919, s1(5).  See R v Archbishops of Canterbury and York Ex 
parte Williamson (1994) The Times 9 March. 
8
 See N Doe, The Law of the Church in Wales (University of Wales Press, 2002). 
9
 See R Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge University Press, 2011) chapter 4. 
10
 Places of Worship Registration Act 1855. 
11
 Marriage Act 1949, s.41.   
12
 Charities Act 2006. 
13
 As explained above, the Church of England (and to a lesser extent the Church in Wales) also have some 
recognition in public law 
9 
 
These private law facilities are occasionally buttressed by legislation.  Religious groups are 
occasionally recognised by statute. Examples include the Trustee Appointment Act 1850 
which simplified the transfer of places of religious worship from one group of trustees to 
another and the Sharing of Church Buildings Act 1969 which facilitates ecumenical sharing 
arrangements as well as more specific pieces of legislation such as the Methodist Church Act 
1976 and United Reformed Church Act 2000.  Statutory recognition does not give a religious 
body legal personality.   
 
The fact that religious groups are treated legally as voluntary associations means that the 
rules and structures of voluntary associations are binding on assenting members. This 
contractual bond may be styled the doctrine of „consensual compact‟.14 As Lord Kingsdown 
acknowledged in Long v Bishop of Capetown
15, members „may adopt rules for enforcing 
discipline within their body which will be binding on those who, expressly or by implication, 
have assented to them.‟  It is also often understood that these rules and structures are also 
binding on the association itself.
16
   
 
Religious Individuals  
With respect to religious individuals, the traditional legal position has been that everyone has 
the right to do whatever they like unless restrained by the law.
17
  Religious laws and practices 
are free to operate where the law of the State is silent.   This „negative‟ protection of religious 
freedom has been bolstered in recent years by a number of laws giving „positive‟ legal rights, 
most notably the Human Rights Act 1998 and new laws prohibiting discrimination on 
grounds of religion or belief.  The Human Rights Act 1998 gave effect in domestic law to the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  
Convention rights (including freedom of religion under Article 9) are now part of domestic 
law, enforceable in domestic courts.
18
  The Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) 
Regulations 2003 and the Equality Act 2006 prohibited for the first time discrimination on 
                                                 
14
 The doctrine is most fully elucidated in the Australian case of Scandrett v Dowling [1992] 27 NSWLR 483 
discussed below.  
15
 (1863) 1 Moore NS Cases 461. 
16
 For example in Davies v Presbyterian Church of Wales [1986] 1 WLR 323 Lord Templemen held that  „The 
law imposes on the church a duty not to deprive a pastor of his office which carries a stipend, save in 
accordance with the procedures set forth in [its] book of rules‟. 
17
 Donaldson MR, AG v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109. 
18
 For analysis see, e.g., M Hill and R Sandberg, „Is Nothing Sacred? Clashing Symbols in a Secular World‟ 
[2007] Public Law 488-506. 
10 
 
grounds of religion or belief in employment and the provision of goods and services.
19
 These 
discrimination law provisions are now to be found in the Equality Act 2010.
20
  
 
The Recognition of Religious Law in England and Wales 
The courts of the State are generally reluctant to become involved in adjudicating internal 
disputes within religious groups concerning religious law.
21
 An example of this may be found 
in the High Court decision in Blake v Associated Newspapers
22
 which concerned the question 
of whether Blake was a proper „Bishop‟.  Blake, a former Church of England cleric who 
founded „The Society for Independent Christian Ministry‟, was suing the defendant for libel 
for calling him a „self styled bishop‟ and an „imitation bishop‟. Gray J held that the issue was 
non-justiciable since „many of the issues [fell] within the territory which the courts, by self-
denying ordinance, will not enter‟.23 Answering such questions „would involve a detailed and 
painstaking examination of questions of doctrine, theology and ecclesiology combining an 
assessment of history and a full understanding of contemporary and emergent theology and 
ecumenism‟.24  
 
This discernible reticence on the part of the English courts to become involved in 
adjudicating disputes within churches may be elevated to a principle of non-interference. In 
His Holiness Sant Baba Jeet Singh Maharaj v Eastern Media Group Ltd
25
 Eady J held that 
„the well-known principle of English law to the effect that the courts will not attempt to rule 
upon doctrinal issues or intervene in the regulation or governance of religious groups‟ 
constituted a self-denying ordinance, applied as a matter of public policy‟.26  He held that 
„such disputes as arise between the followers of any given religious faith are often likely to 
involve doctrines or beliefs which do not readily lend themselves to the sort of resolution 
which is the normal function of a judicial tribunal‟.  Eady J was by no means the first judge to 
recognise this principle. As Simon Brown J stated in 1992, courts are „hardly in a position to 
regulate‟ religious functions: „The court must inevitably be wary of entering so self-evidently 
                                                 
19 For analysis see R Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge University Press, 2011) chapter 5. 
20
 For analysis see ibid chapter 6. 
21
 For discussion of the usefulness of the term „religious law‟ see ibid chapter 9 and the essays in A Huxley (ed) 
Religion, Law and Tradition: Comparative Studies in Religious Law (Routledge, 2002). 
22
 [2003] EWHC 1960. 
23
 Para 24. 
24
 Para 21.  
25
 [2010] EWHC (QB) 1294 
26
 Para 5.  
11 
 
sensitive an area, straying across the well-recognised divide between church and state‟. 27  
Munby J in 2002 held that this meant that „the starting point of the law is an essentially 
agnostic view of religious beliefs and a tolerant indulgence to religious and cultural 
diversity‟.28  
 
This rule was recently asserted by Lord Hope in the Supreme Court in R (on the application 
of E) v JFS Governing Body.
29
  Citing many of the cases mentioned above, Lord Hope held 
that „It has long been understood that it is not the business of the courts to intervene in 
matters of religion‟.30   However, he went on to note the exception to this rule: „It is just as 
well understood, however, that the divide is crossed when the parties to the dispute have 
deliberately left the sphere of matters spiritual over which the religious body has exclusive 
jurisdiction and engaged in matters that are regulated by the civil courts.‟31 This practice, 
which may be styled the Forbes v Eden exception,
32
 means that courts will exceptionally 
intervene to enforce the laws of a religious group where there is a financial interest and in 
relation to the disposal and administration of property.  In doing so, courts will adjudicate on 
and recognise religious law.  
 
Courts recognise religious law in several other ways.
33
  For instance, religious law may enter 
the courtroom as part of the facts of the case,
34
 and religious law may be introduced into the 
courtroom by expert witnesses.
35
  Pieces of State law may give effect to provisions of 
religious law or, more typically, religious practices. For instance, there are special rules on 
slaughter for Muslims and Jews
36
 and concerning the Sikh turban. 
37
 Financial provisions 
                                                 
27
 R v Chief Rabbi, ex parte Wachmann [1992] 1 WLR 1036 at 1043. 
28
 Sulaiman v Juffali [2002] 2 FCR 427 at para 47. 
29
 [2009] UKSC 15. 
30
 Para 157. 
31
 Para 158.  
32
 After the leading case: Forbes v Eden (1867) LR 1 Sc & Div 568.  See R Sandberg, Law and Religion 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011) chapter 4. 
33
 See R Sandberg,  „Islam and English Law‟(2010) 164 Law and Justice 27-44. 
34
 Menski asserts that „Some British judges, virtually every day, have to decide matters of Muslim law and are 
grateful for expert advice, while others resent expert involvement‟: W Menski, „Law, Religion and Culture in 
Multicultural Britain‟ in R Mehdi et al (eds)  Law and Religion in Multicultural Societies (DJØF Publishing, 
2008) 45. 
35
 For an example of this see Uddin v Choudhury & Ors [2009] EWCA Civ 1205.  
36
 Welfare of Animals (Slaughter or Killing) Regulations 1995 (SI 1995/731). 
37
 Sikhs are exempt from the requirement to wear a safety hat on a construction site and from the law relating to 
the wearing of protective headgear for motor cyclists: Employment Act 1989, s11; Road Traffic Act 1988, s 16; 
see S Poulter, Ethnicity, Law and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 1998) ch. 8. 
12 
 
allow Islamic banks, Shariah-compliant mortgages and Islamic Bonds.
38
  Perhaps the clearest 
example of State law recognising religious law is through the Divorce (Religious Marriages) 
Act 2002, discussed below.  
 
Moreover, legislation has been enacted to recognise the jurisdiction of religious bodies to 
regulate aspects of their adherents‟ behaviour.  The clearest example of this is through the 
Arbitration Act 1996, discussed below. In addition English law may be said to recognise 
religious laws through private international law.
39
  A typical example of this would be the 
recognition of marriages conducted overseas.  The key test is whether the recognition 
complies with public policy.
40
  This was underlined by the Court of Appeal decision in KC & 
Anor v City of Westminster Social & Community Services Dept,
41
 concerning a purported 
marriage by telephone link between England and Bangladesh and a lack of mental capacity of 
one party.  The Court of Appeal held that while this was a valid marriage under Islamic law 
and Bangladeshi law it was not valid under English law: the circumstances made the marriage 
sufficiently offensive to the conscience of the English court that it should refuse to recognise 
it.    
 
The Recognition of Religious Family Law in England and Wales 
This section focuses upon the recognition of religious family law by State law in England and 
Wales.  This merits separate discussion given that our research focuses upon the marriage and 
divorce jurisdiction of the three institutions studied.
42
  
 
Marriage 
Religious jurisdiction over family matters has some limited recognition in the civil law of 
England and Wales. Indeed, at common law, the basic validity of a marriage was satisfied by 
                                                 
38
 R Hammond-Sharlot and P Booth, „Islamic Law in the UK‟ (2008) Family Law 362. See also the provisions 
of the Finance Act 2007. 
39
 The term „international law‟ is often used to describe systems of law which govern the relationship between 
States, such as the legal instruments of the United Nations. However, technically this is known as „public 
international Law‟. And this is compared with „private international law‟ which is the part of the national law of 
a country that establishes rules for dealing with cases involving the laws of other countries, foreign law.  
„Private international law‟ is also known as conflict of laws. 
40
 M Robe, „Shari‟a in a European Context‟ in R Grillo et al (ed) Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity 
(Ashgate, 2009) 93, 96-97. 
41
 [2008] EWCA Civ 198 [2009] 2 WLR 185. 
42
 For a more detailed discussion of English law on marriage and divorce see N Lowe and G Douglas, Bromley’s 
Family Law (10
th
 edn. Oxford University Press 2007) chapter 2 and 6 and G Douglas, An Introduction to Family 
Law (2
nd
 edn. Oxford University Press, 2004) chapter 2. 
13 
 
simple conformity with canon law rules,
43
 and the common law itself ceded control over 
marriage status, entry and exit, to the ecclesiastical courts. Since 1753, English law has 
recognised the jurisdiction of certain other religious groups over control of entry into 
marriage. Thus, Jews and Quakers (though no other religious groups) were exempted from 
the requirements of Lord Hardwicke‟s Act of that year, the Clandestine Marriages Act, 
which, as its name suggests, sought to prevent the celebration of marriages in secret, through 
the imposition of rigidly prescribed preliminaries (particularly the calling of banns to ensure 
publicity of the impending union) and the performance of a Church of England ceremony 
open to the public. The penalty for failure to comply with these requirements was that the 
marriage would be regarded as lacking legal validity. In 1836, greater toleration of other 
religious persuasions led to the passage of new legislation which enabled Catholics and 
others to carry out marriages according to their own rites
44
 with the sanction and recognition 
of the state, provided that the fundamental civil rules of capacity to enter marriage were 
complied with (for example, that the marriage entered into would be monogamous and 
heterosexual) and that certain bureaucratic requirements were met (including the registration 
of the premises where the marriage would be performed, and the registration of the 
celebrant). Interestingly, relatively few Muslim, Sikh or Hindu places of religious worship 
have been so licensed,
45
 with these groups preferring to retain their own control over their 
religious rites but at the cost of the parties having to undergo a civil wedding ceremony as 
well if they wish to have civil legal recognition of their union.
46
  
 
Divorce 
In the early nineteenth century, there was no judicial system for divorce, so that the 1836 
legislation did not need to contemplate the question whether recognised religious groups 
                                                 
43
 See R Probert, Marriage Law and Practice in the Long Eighteenth Century: A Reassessment (Cambridge 
Univesity Press, 2009) for a full discussion.  
44
 Or for anyone to undergo a civil ceremony in a register office. The governing legislation is now the Marriage 
Act 1949.  
45
 See ONS, Series FM2: No 35, Marriages 2007 (2010) Table 3.43. Of 40,405 buildings registered in England 
and Wales in 2007, 164 were Muslim, 161 Sikh and 281 „other‟: no figures are given specifically for Hindu 
temples.  
46
  There is a potential alternative way of achieving recognition, if the parties can bring themselves within the 
jurisprudence concerning „presumption of marriage‟. This arises where a couple cohabit and hold themselves 
out as married. In recent years, cases have arisen concerning the validity of marriages where couples have 
undergone religious marriage ceremonies which have not conformed to the requirements of the Marriage Act. In 
Chief Adjudication Officer v Bath [2000] 1 FLR 8, for example, the couple married in a Sikh temple which 
could not be proved to have been registered for the performance of weddings. The Court of Appeal upheld the 
validity of the marriage (for the purposes of establishing entitlement to a widow‟s pension) on the basis of the 
couple‟s cohabitation for nearly 40 years, and the lack of any evidence to show that the temple had not been 
registered.  
14 
 
should have jurisdiction over the exit from marriages under their auspices as well as entry 
into them.  Indeed, only Jews at that time would have had much familiarity with divorce as 
such a means of exit. In 1857, the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts to regulate family 
matters was taken over by the state; in future, both the validity and the termination of 
marriages would be determined by the civil courts, and a Divorce Court was created for the 
first time.
47
 The reason for the state‟s monopoly over the exit from marriage is twofold. First, 
strictly speaking, the concession to religious groups to create legally binding marriages 
extends only to the rites by which the marriage is performed – the marriage itself is, as far as 
the civil law is concerned, a civil marriage, not a Jewish, Catholic or Muslim one, and is 
subject to all the civil rules concerning its validity. Secondly, the state asserts an interest in 
the consequences of the ending of a marriage for the parties themselves, their children and the 
wider society. It thus arrogates to itself the right to control the conditions under which a 
termination other than by death is to be achieved.  
 
However, pressure from the Jewish community to provide some assistance with the problem 
of the agunah (chained wife) has led to some degree of linkage with religious law, through 
the enactment of the Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act 2002. Under Jewish law, a Beth Din 
(court) cannot (except in very rare circumstances) pronounce a divorce. Rather, the wife has 
to receive the bill of divorce – „get’ – from her husband. If he refuses to provide it, the 
marriage cannot be dissolved and the wife cannot marry again in accordance with Jewish 
rites, even if she obtains a civil divorce.
48
  In order to provide some leverage to a wife in this 
position, the 2002 Act
49
 provides that a court may delay the making absolute of a civil 
divorce decree until the parties have certified that a religious divorce has been granted by the 
appropriate authorities. At present, only the Jewish religion is included within this provision, 
but it is open to other religions to seek to be „prescribed‟ within the legislation.   
 
The lack of mutual recognition by the civil and religious authorities of each others‟ 
pronouncements has created numerous legal problems, ranging from dealing with „forced 
marriage‟50 (or marriage by proxy over the telephone)51 to the creation of „limping divorces‟ 
                                                 
47
 Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act 1857.  
48
 This is the understanding within the Jewish Orthodox Community in the UK. Within Reform Judaism a get is 
not necessary as a civil divorce is regarded as sufficient to end the marriage. See The Beth Din: Jewish Courts in 
the UK, Centre for Social Cohesion (2009) 2. 
49
 Now contained in s 10A of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.  
50
 Now see the Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007.  
15 
 
whereby a union may be regarded as dissolved (or not) in religious law but not in civil law, 
and vice versa. These problems can be compounded where one religious ceremony takes 
place in another jurisdiction which may give it civil legal recognition so that the parties are 
married, not just in the eyes of their religion, but also under the law of one country, but not 
another. It is not surprising, therefore, that there have been increasing calls for greater 
recognition of religious laws as providing legal status to family members and equally a 
concern for caution in assessing the implications, both nationally and internationally, of such 
a move.  
 
The Recognition of Religious Courts in England and Wales  
English law tends to provide recognition of religious bodies and their laws rather than their 
courts. As a matter of public law in England and Wales, the variously styled courts and 
tribunals of all religious communities other than the Church of England are not subject to 
review by the courts of the State.
 52
  In R v Chief Rabbi, ex parte Wachmann
53
 the claimant 
sought judicial review of a decision by the Chief Rabbi, following a commission of enquiry, 
that Wachmann was no longer morally and religiously fit to hold rabbinical office, on 
grounds of procedural unfairness.  Simon Brown J refused leave on the basis that there was 
no „governmental interest in the decision-making power in question‟, and that the  Chief 
Rabbi‟s „functions are essentially to initiate spiritual and religious functions which the 
government could not and would not seek to discharge in his place were he to abdicate his 
regulatory responsibility‟.  This has been followed in relation to decisions made by an 
Imam,
54
 a Jewish Beth Din
55
 and the Provincial Court of the Church in Wales.
56
 This does not 
                                                                                                                                                        
51
 KC & Anor v City of Westminster Social & Community Services Dept. & Anor [2008] EWCA Civ 198 [2009] 
2 WLR 185. 
52
 The decisions of the courts of the Church of England are subject to judicial review (since it is established by 
law).  Section 81 of the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 states that the High Court has power to enquire 
into contempt of the consistory court upon certification by the chancellor and recognises the supervisory 
jurisdiction of the High Court over the ecclesiastical court. It has been held that mandatory and prohibiting 
orders (as they are now styled) lie both to prevent and compel the exercise of jurisdiction by the ecclesiastical 
courts of the Church of England (See e.g. R v North, ex parte Oakey [1927] 1 KB 491).  Whilst it has been a 
long settled principle that a quashing order (formerly certiorari) does not lie to overturn the decision of an 
ecclesiastical court (R v Chancellor of St Edmundsbury and Ipswich Diocese, ex parte White [1948] 1 KB 195), 
this rule has been the subject of criticism (R v Chancellor of Chichester Consistory Court, ex parte News Group 
Newspapers Ltd [1992] COD 48) and may be no longer sustainable, particularly in the light of general 
developments in judicial review (See R v Exeter Consistory Court, ex parte Cornish (1998) 5 Ecc LJ 212). See 
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mean, however, that there may not be a different outcome in a case where the necessary 
public element was present. Moreover, it does not mean that the decisions of these courts are 
not recognised by State courts. There are two different ways in which the decisions of 
religious courts are so recognised.  
 
The first is through the doctrine of „consensual compact‟ referred to above. This recognises 
that the rules and structures of voluntary associations are binding on assenting members.  The 
doctrine is most fully elucidated in the Australian case of Scandrett v Dowling,
57
 concerning 
the Church of England in Australia where it was held that „the binding effect of the 
“voluntary consensual compact”…must have come from the shared faith of the members of 
the Church, or…their baptism in Christ‟, from „a willingness to be bound to it because of 
shared faith…in foro conscientiae‟: „its binding effect does not come from the availability of 
the secular sanctions of State courts of law‟; „the availability of these latter sanctions when 
spiritual matters become mixed with property matters is an incident of the consensual 
compact or contract‟; so: „where property is involved the consensual compact or contract is 
given the same effect, in relation to property matters, as if it were a common law contract, but 
does not in any way alter the primary basis of that compact or contract‟. The doctrine of 
„consensual compact‟ means that the rules and structures of voluntary associations are 
binding on assenting members and the courts of the State will exceptionally intervene to 
enforce the laws of a religious group where there is a financial interest and in relation to the 
disposal and administration of property.
58
 
 
The second way in which the decisions of religious courts are recognised is through the 
Arbitration Act 1996.
59
  This, the latest in a long line of similar statutes, provides that people 
are free to choose to have their disputes arbitrated outside the civil court system but 
recognised and enforced by the civil courts.
60
 The Act focuses not upon courts but upon 
people.  Section 1 provides that „parties should be free to agree how their disputes are 
resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public interest‟.  People can 
decide how disputes between them are to be resolved and once the parties decide to be bound 
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by that decision then the secular courts will enforce that decision under the secular law of 
contract.  There are two main limitations upon this, however. 
 
Limitations under the Arbitration Act 1996  
The first limitation is as stated in section 1: the secular courts will not enforce a decision 
where there is „public policy which requires the court not to‟.61   An agreement to arbitrate is 
just like any other contract: it is necessary to show a genuine agreement to arbitrate by both 
parties.
 62
  Contracts obtained by duress or those formed with minors or the incapacitated will 
not be enforced.  The agreement to arbitrate must be in writing.
63
  
 
Section 33 of the Arbitration Act 1996 states the general duty of the arbitrator. It must: 
(a) act fairly and impartially as between the parties, giving each party a reasonable 
opportunity of putting his case and dealing with that of his opponent, and 
(b) adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the particular case, avoiding 
unnecessary delay or expense, so as to provide a fair means for the resolution of the 
matters falling to be determined. 
 
An arbitration award that does not comply with this can be set aside by the English court.
64
  
This also applies where the agreement suffers from a „serious irregularity‟ such as: exceeding 
its powers; failure to conduct the proceedings in accordance with the procedure agreed by the 
parties; failure to deal with all the issues that were put to it; and uncertainty or ambiguity as 
to the effect of the award.
65
 
 
The importance of this public policy limitation is shown in the Court of Appeal decision in 
Soleimany v Soleimany.
66
  In that case two Iranian Jewish merchants were exporting Persian 
carpets. This breached Iranian law.  The two merchants fell out and took their dispute to the 
Beth Din.  The Beth Din considered the illegality irrelevant under the applicable Jewish law 
and made an arbitration award.   The Court of Appeal recognised this arbitration award made 
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by the Beth Din as „a valid agreement‟,67 but refused to enforce it on grounds that public 
policy would not allow an English court to enforce an illegal contract.
68
  This did not affect 
the court‟s conclusion that the Beth Din had jurisdiction.69   
 
The second limitation is that the Act only applies to civil disputes; the criminal law is outside 
its operation.  A victim and defendant could not agree that a breach of English criminal law 
be decided by arbitration.
70
  In English criminal law the „dispute‟ is between the Crown and 
the defendant, not between the parties.  English law provides no legal right for victims to 
have the defendant punished.
71
   Any imprisonment or physical punishment for a religious 
offence could not be recognised by the English court.  Arbitration awards are enforced by the 
civil courts.
72
  With the exception of the offence of contempt of court, civil courts have no 
power to imprison anyone.   A religious court enforcing punishment would find itself liable 
under English criminal law for assault or false imprisonment.
73
  
 
Arbitration also has limited application under family law. Religious courts can grant religious 
divorces but not legal divorces.  Individuals may seek mediation from a religious source but 
this is a non-binding method of dispute resolution.
74
  
 
The Effect of the Arbitration Act 1996 
The Arbitration Act 1996 is a facilitative piece of legislation, giving the parties the choice to 
agree to resolve their disputes outside the courtroom.  If an agreement is made to arbitrate a 
dispute then any other legal proceedings may be stayed.
75
  The courts refuse to consider 
disputes which parties have decided to resolve by arbitration; rather than considering the 
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dispute themselves the courts enforce the decision the arbitrator has made.
76
  One of the few 
changes to the law of arbitration made by the 1996 Act
77
 was the way in which it „very 
severely limited the right to apply to appeal from an arbitration award‟.78   
 
Under the Act, the parties are free to agree on the number of arbitrators to form the tribunal 
and whether there is to be a chairman or umpire.
79
 They are also free to decide upon the 
procedure for appointing the arbitrator or arbitrators.
80
  The parties are free to agree in what 
circumstances the authority of an arbitrator may be revoked.
81
   An arbitrator is not liable for 
anything done or omitted in the discharge or purported discharge of his functions as arbitrator 
unless the act or omission is shown to have been in bad faith.
82
 
 
The Arbitration Act 1996 is largely used for commercial purposes and it has many 
advantages: it is private, cheaper and more flexible than full legal proceedings.
 83
  It can be 
used to recognise the decisions of religious courts.
84
  Technically, it is not used by religious 
courts like the Beth Din themselves but is used by individual litigants who decide to take 
their dispute to a religious court.  The key fact about arbitration is that it allows the parties to 
decide what law the arbitrators will use to decide their dispute.   This extends to systems of 
religious law.   Section 46 of the Arbitration Act 1996 enables parties to choose for disputes 
to be decided „in accordance with other considerations‟ rather than „in accordance with 
law‟.85  For these purposes „law‟ has generally been understood to mean the law of the 
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State.
86
  „Other considerations‟, however, can extend to other systems of law that are not the 
law of the State such as religious law.
87
 Section 46 thus allows parties to choose for their 
dispute to be decided in accordance with systems of religious law, such as Jewish
88
 or 
Islamic
89
 law. Therefore parties may take a dispute to a religious court and enter into a 
contract to be bound by that court‟s decision. 
 
However, the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Jivraj v Hashwani
90
 has suggested 
that arbitration agreements which make distinctions on grounds of religion may fall foul of 
religious discrimination laws.   The case concerned an arbitration agreement entered into in 
1981 which required that all arbitrators were to come from the Ismaili community.  When one 
of the parties sought to appoint an arbitrator from outside this community, he contended that 
he was permitted to do so because, whilst the requirement had been lawful when the 
agreement was made, it had been rendered unlawful by new laws prohibiting discrimination 
on grounds of religion or belief in relation to employment.
91
 The Court of Appeal agreed.
92
  
Moore-Bick LJ held that the law prohibiting religious discrimination in relation to 
employment applied to arbitrators because employment was defined as meaning 
„employment under a contract of service‟ and the nature of the arbitration was contractual.93   
Moreover, the party seeking to enforce the requirement could not rely on the religious 
exception that permits a person with an „ethos based on religion or belief‟ to insist that being 
of a particular religion or belief is an occupational requirement of a job.
94
  Since the 
arbitration agreement required the arbitrators to resolve the dispute in accordance with 
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English law, it had not been shown that it was necessary for the arbitrators to be members of 
the Ismaili community.
95
   The long term implications of the Court of Appeal‟s judgment in 
Jivraj v Hashwani upon the use of the Arbitration Act for religious purposes are unknown.   
At the very least the judgment suggests that parties who wish their disputes to be determined 
by representatives of a particular religious tradition must ensure that they have shown that 
this is a genuine occupational requirement.
96
    
 
Moreover, the provisions of the Arbitration Act 1996 do not allow the State simply to wash 
its hands of these matters.  Human rights instruments stress the importance of the right to a 
fair trial and States may be liable if basic standards are not met. At the level of the Untied 
Nations, Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights protects the 
right to a fair trial. The Human Rights Committee have stressed that this right applies to 
arbitration by religious courts:  
Article 14 is also relevant where a State, in its legal order, recognizes courts based on 
customary law, or religious courts, to carry out or entrusts them with judicial tasks. It 
must be ensured that such courts cannot hand down binding judgments recognized by 
the State, unless the following requirements are met: proceedings before such courts 
are limited to minor civil and criminal matters, meet the basic requirements of fair 
trial and other relevant guarantees of the Covenant, and their judgments are validated 
by State courts in light of the guarantees set out in the Covenant and can be 
challenged by the parties concerned in a procedure meeting the requirements of article 
14 of the Covenant. These principles are notwithstanding the general obligation of the 
State to protect the rights under the Covenant of any persons affected by the operation 
of customary and religious courts.
97
 
 
The right to fair trial is also safeguarded by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and this is part of English law by virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998.  The European 
Court of Human Rights has insisted that States are under an obligation to ensure that 
standards concerning the right to a fair trial are met by religious courts.   Pellegrini v Italy
98
 
concerned Catholic annulment proceedings in an ecclesiastical court where the applicant was 
not told the nature of proceedings in advance and was not allowed to read her husband‟s 
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witness statements.  The Italian courts made operative the Vatican court‟s declaration of 
nullity. The European Court of Human Rights held that the proceedings in the ecclesiastical 
courts violated Article 6 ECHR in that the applicant‟s right to fair trial had been 
„irremediably compromised‟.  Since the Vatican is not party to the Convention, the claim was 
made against the Italian State: the Court held that since the Italian courts made operative the 
Vatican court‟s declaration of nullity then the State was in breach of Article 6 since the courts 
„should have refused to confirm the outcome of such unfair proceedings‟ and that they had 
„failed in their duty to check ... that the applicant had enjoyed a fair trial in the ecclesiastical 
proceedings‟.   It follows from Pellegrini v Italy that the United Kingdom would be in breach 
of Article 6 if a religious court failed to meet Article 6 standards as to the right to a fair trial 
and then that decision was enforced under the Arbitration Act 1996.  
 
There are numerous examples of the decisions of religious courts being enforced under the 
Arbitration Act - particularly the Jewish Beth Din.
99
  There are fewer examples in respect of 
Islamic courts and there is evidence of at least one case where the decision of the Islamic 
Sharia Council of London (ISC) was not so enforced,
100
  the decision in A-Midani v Al-
Midani.
101
   However, on the facts of that case it was clear that the parties had not agreed to 
arbitration by the ISC.
102
   Whilst it is true that other Islamic courts and tribunals have 
generally not operated under the Arbitration Act,
 
A-Midani v Al-Midani does not mean an 
Islamic court or tribunal can never operate under the Arbitration Act.  As the High Court 
made clear, that the ISC was not „in this instance at any rate, an arbitration tribunal‟.103  
There is now at least one clear example of an Islamic court operating under the Arbitration 
Act 1996: the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT).
104
  The MAT website makes it clear that 
they operate under the Arbitration Act 1996.
105
 They deal with all areas of civil and personal 
religious law but not divorce proceedings (other than a religious divorce), the care of children 
and criminal matters.
106
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Even religious courts which use the Arbitration Act 1996, such as the Beth Din and the MAT, 
also operate outside the Arbitration Act.  A distinction is sometimes drawn between their 
„legal‟ functions under the Arbitration Act and „religious‟ functions.  For instance, a study of 
the Beth Din by the Centre for Social Cohesion states that: „The Beth Din serves two distinct 
functions for members of the Jewish communities in the UK‟.  First, „Jewish courts function 
as legally binding arbitration tribunals for civil cases‟. Second, „The Beth Din also functions 
as a religious - and not legal - authority [ruling] in a variety of religious matters‟ such as 
designating religious holidays or granting religious divorces‟.107   It is often suggested that 
where religious courts do not use the Arbitration Act then they are operating extra-legally and 
their decisions are not legally binding at all.   However, this is not the case.  As we have seen, 
the doctrine of „consensual compact‟ means that the rules and structures of voluntary 
associations are binding on assenting members and the courts of the State will exceptionally 
intervene to enforce the laws of a religious group where there is a financial interest and in 
relation to the disposal and administration of property.
108
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Part Two: Religious Courts in England and Wales  
 
Introduction  
Whilst the first part of this commentary has sought to elucidate the legal status of religious 
laws and courts, this second part examines the extent to which religious courts operate in the 
UK today, with particular reference to the three institutions that we have studyied in greater 
depth.  It falls into three sections. The first section examines the existence of religious courts 
in the UK, with special reference to Judaism, Islam and Christianity. The second section 
examines the organisational structure of the three selected institutions where we have 
undertaken our empirical investigation:  the Jewish London Beth Din, Family Division; the 
Shariah Council of the Birmingham Central Mosque and the Catholic National Tribunal for 
Wales in Cardiff. The third section explores the jurisdiction each of these institutions has in 
relation to marriage, divorce and remarriage and how this is administered and reinforced.  
 
Religious Courts in the UK 
It is difficult to quantify the number of religious courts that exists within the United 
Kingdom. This is partly due to the fact that there is no general consensus as to what is meant 
by the terms „religious‟ or „court‟. With the exception of the courts of the Church of 
England,
109
 the courts that belong to other faith communities are not part of the State court 
system.
110
    They are instead formed by individual religious organisations and are variously 
styled according to the needs of the faith community in question.   Some of these courts bear 
few similarities to the courts found in civil law.  In some religious traditions, there is no 
distinction between executive, judicial and legislative functions.  Moreover, whilst some 
courts are very formal with proceedings taking place in designated rooms, in other religious 
groups the situation is much more informal.
111
 There are also marked differences within 
religious traditions and there is significant regional variation, depending upon resources, 
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perceived needs and the mindsets of those responsible.  Furthermore, the nature and role of 
religious courts evolve over time in response to changes in theological interpretation, social 
need and changes in civil law.
112
   
 
Our empirical study explores three selected „religious courts‟ in England and Wales: the 
Jewish London Beth Din, Family Division; the Shariah Council of the Birmingham Central 
Mosque and the Catholic National Tribunal for Wales in Cardiff.  This section seeks to 
provide a contextual setting for these courts, exploring the existence of Jewish, Islamic and 
Catholic courts in the UK.  
 
Judaism  
Like Islam, Judaism is often seen as being a religion of law.
113
  According to Neusner and 
Sonn, the law of Judaism is to be found in „the record of the tradition, written and oral, of 
God‟s revelation to Moses at Sinai‟.114  The written tradition is found in the Hebrew 
Scriptures whilst the oral
115
 tradition is found in a variety of documents, commentaries, codes 
and responsa (the replies written by sages in response to questions posed by the faithful).
116
   
There is a long history of courts existing within Judaism.  As Neusner and Sonn note, „the 
law of Judaism provides for three correlated but autonomous institutions to exercise the 
power to inflict sanctions in the enforcement of the law: God, the court, and the temple‟.117   
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No figures exist concerning the number of Jewish courts in the United Kingdom today.   The 
interpretation and observance of Jewish law varies amongst the different branches of Judaism 
in Britain (Orthodox, Masorti, Reform and Liberal).
118
 The different branches within Judaism 
have their own rabbinic authorities and interpret Jewish law for their associated 
synagogues.
119
  The study of the Beth Din by the Centre for Social Cohesion states that the 
Liberal, Masorti and Reform movements, which collectively represent just over a third of 
Britain‟s Jews,120 run separate Batei Din which „span from the traditional to the progressive 
both in their practices and attitude to Jewish law‟.121 Several different courts exist within the 
Orthodox tradition.
122
 In addition to the London Beth Din which is the subject of our 
investigation, other orthodox courts include:
123
 the Beth Din of the Federation of Synagogues 
in London,
124
 the Sephardic Beth Din of the Spanish & Portugal Jews‟ Congregation in 
London
125
 and the Beth Din of the Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations.
 
 
 
The London Beth Din is part of the United Synagogue, an umbrella organisation representing 
the majority of Britain‟s Orthodox Jewish community.126  The synagogues aligned to the 
United Synagogue recognise the authority of the Chief Rabbi, an office which has existed 
since before the eighteenth century. The London Beth Din has its origins in the meetings of 
the Chef Rabbi and other Rabbis to carry out conversions, divorces and arbitrations, probably 
on an ad hoc manner.  Like the office of the Chief Rabbi, the Beth Din pre-dates the United 
Synagogue which was established for religious purposes under the Jewish United 
Synagogues Act 1870.  Over time, the Beth Din was brought under the remit of the United 
Synagogue.
127
 Today, one of the functions of the United Synagogue is: 
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Council in April 1999, which set out the Charity's objects, its role and powers. See 
<http://www.theus.org.uk/the_united_synagogue/about_the_us/us_jigsaw/>  
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To provide an ecclesiastical court of Jewish law (the Court of the Chief Rabbi) as well 
as the preparation, production and supervision of food and drink for Jewish people to 
enable such persons to better conform to their religious beliefs.
128
 
The Beth Din is funded by the United Synagogue and its Dayanim are employees of the 
United Synagogue.  Jewish courts perform a wide range of different functions, including the 
regulation of slaughter and kosher food, conversions,
129 
arbitrating agreements, burial 
practices, determining personal status and a host of issues concerning marriage and divorce. 
  
Islam  
As with Judaism, Islamic law is considered to regulate all aspects of a believer‟s life.130   Its 
ultimate revealed sources are in two forms: written and oral.
131
  The written text, the Qur‟an, 
believed to be delivered though the prophet Muhammad
132
 is complemented by an oral 
tradition, the Sunnah.
133
    An important distinction exists between the shariah, „the source 
from which the law is derived‟,  and Fiqh, „the method by which law is derived and applied‟: 
while Shariah „is divine in nature and thus immutable‟, Fiqh „is a human product that may 
change according to time and circumstances‟.134  There is a long tradition within Islam of 
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 Statutes of the United Synagogue 1999, 5.7.  
129
 „While Judaism is not a proselytising religion, conversions are carried out by courts of Jewish religious law 
(Beth Din, plural Batei Din). Each Beth Din has different arrangements and not all foreign or even Israeli 
conversions are necessarily accepted by the United Kingdom Batei Din.‟: Board of Deputies, „Jewish Life and 
Customs‟  7. 
130
 For example, Islamic law „is much more than law in the modern sense‟; „It also functions as a vocabulary of 
morality and justice‟; It is a „total discourse‟, whereby all kinds of institutions find simultaneous expression: 
religious, legal, moral and economic‟: S Zubaida, Law and Power in the Islamic World (I B Tauris, London 
2003) 1; Islamic law is „a moral code, a field of abstract theological investigation, and a process of addressing 
the relationships and conflicts that may arise among the faithful‟ and „is intimately entwined with other portions 
of Islamic culture and society‟ (L Rosen, The Justice of Islam (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000) ix)). 
131
 J Neusner and T Sonn, Comparing Religions Through Law (Routledge, London 1999) 19. As discussed 
above, the „oral‟ label does not mean that these teachings were not written down. The label is used to distinguish 
between the „received‟ written text of the Q‟uran which was delivered through the Prophet Muhammed and the 
oral tradition whuich was carried in reports which rrelated to the words and deeds of the prophets.  
132
 Of the approximately 6000 verses included in the Qur‟an strict legal content is only attached to about 80 
verses. These tend to focus upon issues of Islamic Family Law particularly with regard to divorce (talaq): J 
Rehman, „The Sharia, Islamic Family Laws and International Human Rights Law:  Examining the theory and 
practice of polygamy and talaq‟ (2007) 21 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 108. 
133
 These are comprised of the traditions and practices of the Prophet Muhammad.  These were carried in reports 
(known as hadith) which were later collected and codified. The Sunni collections refer to Traditions (Hadith) 
that have been collected into six canonical compilations and the two most authentic are al-Bukhari (d. 870) and 
Muslim ibn al Hajjaj (d. 874).  The Shia have their own collections and also rely on the sayings and doings of 
their holy Imams: J Rehman, „The Sharia, Islamic Family Laws and International Human Rights Law:  
Examining the theory and practice of polygamy and talaq‟ (2007) 21 International Journal of Law, Policy and 
the Family 108. 
134
 M A Baderin, International Human Rights and Islamic Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003) 33-34. 
However, such a clear-cut distinction is controversial: for Zubaida, the revealed Sharia „is largely man-made, 
based on exegesis, interpretations, analogies, and extensive borrowing from customary practices … and existing 
local middle Eastern legal traditions‟ as well as „possible adaptations of Roman law‟.  Indeed: „This hybrid 
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religious leaders and scholars interpreting and deciding upon questions of Islamic law.
135
 
Those who possess all the necessary textual and rational skills to do so acquire the status of 
Mufti – someone who issues fatwas.  A fatwa is simply a ruling on a matter of shariah law, 
usually issued in response to a questions raised by a member of the public.  The fashioning of 
such rulings forms the basis of some of the work of Shariah Councils.
136
 
 
Existing research cannot confirm the precise number or nature of all the systems of applying 
Muslim legal norms in the UK today. It is clear that there is significant use of informal forms 
of dispute resolution within Muslim communities, particularly in the context of Muslim 
family law.
137
  Moreover, a report for Civitas has asserted that there are at least 85 Shariah 
Councils operating mainly out of mosques around the country with 13 tribunals operating 
within the network administered by the Islamic Sharia Council based in Leyton,
 138
 and there 
are three run by the Association of Muslim Lawyers.
139
  In addition to these exists the 
Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT).
 140
  The MAT, the Islamic Sharia Council and the 
                                                                                                                                                        
formation poses interesting questions for modern contexts of reform and “fundamentalism”: both try to rescue 
the divine message from the man-made historical accretions, but come to quite different conclusions regarding 
the essence of the divine message‟: S Zubaida, Law and Power in the Islamic World (I B Tauris, London 2003) 
10. 
135
 These leaders and scholars refer to themselves under various names or titles (e.g., Registrar, Imam, Sheikh, 
Maulana or Qadi).   Each term can be translated as religious scholar and the variation in usage was due to 
personal preference.  Bano notes that the term „judge‟ does not tend to be used and that such personnel were 
keen to underline the fact that their verdicts were not legally binding under English law but served to uphold the 
moral authority of the Muslim community: S Bano, „Islamic Family Arbitration, Justice and Human Rights in 
Britain‟ (2007) (1) Social Justice and Global Development Law  
 <http://www.go.warwick.ac.uk/elj/lgd/2007_1/bano> 
136
 According to a report for Civitas, some of these rulings appear on websites such as Ask Imam or Islam 
Online, and are available to Sharia courts where they are chosen on the strength of the mufti who issued them or 
the validity of his religious affiliation (see D MacEoin, „Sharia Law or „One Law for All?‟ (Civitas, The 
Cromwell Press Group 2009) <http://www.civitas.org.uk/pdf/ShariaLawOrOneLawForAll.pdf>).  However, 
these websites (such as the one on the Birmingham Central Mosque website) appear to be more a source of 
religious advice and guidance (rather than a legal ruling or fatwa) and are based on the responses of individual 
Imams to specific questions from the Muslim community.  However on the Q&A section on the Islamic Sharia 
Council website responses to questions are posted as „fatwa‟s‟.  
137
 M Malik, „Muslim Legal Norms and the Integration of European Muslims (EUI Working Paper RSCAS 
2009/29, July 2009, Italy: European University Institute) . 
138
 The Islamic Sharia Council is a registered charity and its constitution empowers it to preside over cases 
where either party has been living permanently in this country and at least one of the parties has made an 
application, requesting the Council's judgment. Islamic Sharia Council <http://www.islamic-sharia.org>  
139
 D MacEoin, „Sharia Law or „One Law for All?‟ (Civitas, The Cromwell Press Group 2009). 
140
 The MAT makes it clear that they operate under the Arbitration Act 1996. It claims to deal with all areas of 
civil and personal religious law but not „divorce proceedings (other than a religious divorce), child custody and 
criminal matters‟.  It also has a reconciliation role. Their Rules of Procedure state that it acknowledges that it 
must operate within the framework of the secular law. In fact, they state that they had „modelled [the Rules on 
Procedure] on existing tribunal procedural rules‟. They do not state which tribunal rules. The Rules of Procedure 
allow for any applicant to be legally represented if they so wish. The adjudication panel consists of two 
members, a legally qualified member and a recognised Islamic Scholar.  See the MAT website 
(http://www.matribunal.com/) and also a written submission on the Interfaith Legal Advisers Network (ILAN) 
website (<http://www.law.cf.ac.uk/clr/networks/ilan4.html>). 
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Birmingham Shariah Council (which is the subject of our study)
141
 all claim that they do not 
represent any single school of thought and will base their „verdicts‟ upon rulings derived 
from the four main schools of Sunni
142
 brought together with other sources from the Sunni 
tradition, as well as minority interpretations.
143
  
 
Shariah Councils serve as alternative forums for dispute resolution which apply Muslim legal 
and ethical principles as well as the cultural norms of local communities.
144
 Shariah Councils 
have three main functions; reconciliation and mediation:  issuing Muslim divorce certificates; 
and producing expert opinion reports on Muslim family law and practice.
145
 However the 
main role of Shariah Councils is that of administering Islamic family law and particularly 
Islamic divorce. For instance, 95% of correspondence received by the Islamic Sharia Council 
to date has related to matrimonial problems faced by Muslims in the UK.
146
 
 
Christianity  
Unlike the categories, Jewish law and Islamic law, the term „Christian law‟ is not in regular 
use.
147
 Although the term „canon law‟ is sometimes employed to provide the Christian 
equivalent of systems of religious law,
148
 the term is often reserved for the Catholic, Anglican 
and Orthodox churches.  Even in that context, the term is problematic,
149
 being employed in 
various ways, some very narrow;
150
  some very wide.
151
   It is often asserted that other 
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 Birmingham Central Mosque <http://centralmosque.org.uk>    
142
 Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'I and Hanbali 
143
 For Yilmaz this modern phenomenon (Takayyar) which denotes selection of the most appealing and 
appropriate doctrine from amongst the existing Islamic schools provides a more equitable solution in 
circumstances where insistence on the application of the principles derived from any one school would lead to 
injustice: I Yilmaz, ‘Law as Chameleon:  The Question of Incorporation of Muslim Personal Law into English 
Law’ (2001) 21 Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 297. 
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 M Malik, „Muslim Legal Norms and the Integration of European Muslims‟ (EUI Working Paper RSCAS 
2009/29, July 2009, Italy: European University Institute) < http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/11653> 
145
 S Bano, „Islamic Family Arbitration, Justice and Human Rights in Britain‟ (2007) (1) Social Justice and 
Global Development Law <http://www.go.warwick.ac.uk/elj/lgd/2007_1/bano> 
146
 Islamic Sharia Council <http://www.islamic-sharia.org> 
147
 For arguments that it can, and should be, see N Doe, „Modern Church Law‟ in J Witte Jr and F S Alexander 
(eds) Christianity and Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008) 274 and N Doe, „The Concept of 
Christian Law – A Case Study: Concepts of “a Church” in a Comparative and Ecumenical Context‟ in N Doe 
and R Sandberg (eds), Law and Religion: New Horizons (Peeters, 2010) 243. 
148
 See, for instance, S Ferrari, „Canon Law as a Religious Legal System‟ in A Huxley (ed), Religion, Law and 
Tradition: Comparative Studies in Religious Law (Routledge, London 2002) 49, which focuses purely on the 
law of the Roman Catholic Church. 
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 See N Doe, The Legal Framework of the Church of England (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1996) 12-13.   
150
 For example, „the expression “canon law” is used restrictively to mean the Canons of the Church of 
England‟: M Hill, Ecclesiastical Law 3rd edn (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007) 2.  
151
 See for instance, the assertion that canon law is „so much of the law of England as is concerned with the 
regulation of the affairs of the Church of England‟; its sources include: theology (embracing divine law); the 
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Christian denominations do not have canon law.  However, as Arthur concluded, „the 
Methodist
152
 and United Reformed Churches have set up structures of varying flexibility that 
act like Canon Law‟,153  as have the Baptists.154 Indeed, most Christian groups have rules 
which are binding, usually on both an international and local level.
155
 These laws can be 
compared with those found within other world religions, especially if it is remembered that 
the terms „Jewish law‟, „Islamic law‟ or „Hindu law‟ refer to „pluralist‟ legal systems rather 
than to „a solidly uniform legal system‟.156    
 
The focus in this study is on the (Roman) Catholic Church. The laws of different Christian 
churches are comprised of both the rules found in sacred texts and also the more practical 
rules developed by religious groups themselves
157
 and this is true of the law of the Catholic 
Church, which „springs from the will of Christ, but its minute and detailed rules come from 
human agents…that is, the pope and the bishops‟.158  The Code of Canon Law159 is the 
central and coordinating compilation of the Western (or Latin) church and is the primary 
source of reference for Catholic canon law.
160
 The Code outlines specific processes for the 
resolution of disputes or offences within the community.
 161
  Regulations for marrying, the 
conduct of marriage and the prohibition of divorce are outlined with particular specificity.
162
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
common law of England; and Acts of Parliament: T Briden and B Hanson, Moore’s Introduction to English 
Canon Law 3
rd
 edn (Mowbrays, London  1992) 4.   
152
 See also in relation to the Methodist Church, G Powell, Towards a Definition of Global Methodism: A 
Comparative Study of the Canon Laws of Methodist Churches (Doctoral Thesis, Cardiff University 
forthcoming).  
153
 G Arthur, Law, Liberty and Church: Authority and Justice in the Major Churches in England (Ashgate, 
Aldershot  2006) 172.  See also F Cranmer „Regulation in the Religious Society of Friends‟ (2003) 7 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal 176. 
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 Even though Arthur concludes that there is no equivalent to canon law in the Baptist Church, where issues of 
church discipline are the responsibility of the local church,  Doe has included Baptists in his study of „Modern 
Church Law‟ pointing out that the Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland and the Baptist World Alliance 
both have constitutions. N Doe, „Modern Church Law‟ in J Witte Jr and F S Alexander (eds) Christianity and 
Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008) 271 at 274, 275, 277. 
155
 Ibid 271. 
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 W Menski, Hindu Law: Beyond Tradition and Modernity (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003) 47, fn 33. 
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 In the Anglican context, this difference is elucidated in the Principles of Canon Law which distinguishes 
between „fundamental authoritative sources of law‟ namely „Scripture, tradition and reason‟ and „formal 
sources‟ such as „constitutions, canons, rules, regulations and other instruments‟: Principles 4(1) and 4(2).  
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 L Örsy, „Towards a Theological Conception of Canon Law‟ in J Hite and  DJ Ward (eds) Readings, Cases, 
Materials in Canon Law (Collegeville 1990)  10, 11. 
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 First codified in 1917, the current Code originates from 1983. 
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 For a full discussion of the sources of Catholic Canon law see J A Coriden, Introduction to Canon Law 
(Cassell Publishers, London 1991) 31. 
161
 As Coriden notes, „“Canon law” is the name for the church‟s own system of regulations, its rules of 
discipline‟: J A Coriden, The Rights of Catholics in the Church (Paulist Press, New York 2007) xii-xiii.  
162
 Interestingly, the Code „does not, for the most part, regulate liturgical matters‟: J A Coriden, Introduction to 
Canon Law (Cassell Publishers, London 1991) 40.  See Canon 2. 
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The Church has its own court system.
163
 However, the judicial process is treated as a last 
resort.
164
 This is true even once the process has begun: the parties are under a canonical duty 
to settle amicably, promptly and equitably out of court.
165
   The object of a trial is to 
prosecute or to vindicate the rights of physical or juridical persons, to declare juridical facts 
or to declare the penalty for offences.
166
  Judicial power is exercised by judges or judicial 
colleges.
167
  The courts are ordered hierarchically.
168
 The tribunal of first instance is the 
diocesan court.
169
  This is presided over by the Bishop who may exercise judicial power 
personally
170
 or through others.
171
 The Bishop‟s judge is the judicial vicar who may be 
assisted by adjutant judicial vicars who must be priests.
172
  Lay judges may be appointed.
173
  
Other court personnel include:
174
  
 Auditors (who gather evidence)175  
 The Promoter of Justice (who provides for the public good, which is at stake 
whenever the Bishop says it is or when stated by the law that it is, such as in nullity of 
marriage cases)
176
 
 The Defender of the Bond (who must be summoned in all cases involving nullity of 
marriage. Their role is to propose and clarify all that can be reasonably argued against 
nullity or dissolution),
177
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 We are indebted to Eithne D‟Auria for her help in preparing this part of the commentary.  
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 N Doe, The Legal Framework of the Church of England: A Critical Study in a Comparative Context  
(Clarendon Press, Oxford 1996) 142. 
165
 Canon 1446. See also Canons 1713-16 concerning arbitration.  
166
 Canon 1400. 
167
 Canon 135.  
168
 N Doe, The Legal Framework of the Church of England: A Critical Study in a Comparative Context  
(Clarendon Press, Oxford 1996) 151. 
169
 The term „diocese‟ refers to the territories that are subject to the jurisdiction of Bishops.  At the smallest 
level, dioceses are divided into parishes.  
170
 Unless he has a direct interest.  
171
 Canon 1419. 
172
 Canon 1420. The Judicial Vicar is appointed by the Bishop. He has vicarious power – exercised in the 
Bishops name, not their own.  The Judicial Vicar must be confirmed on the arrival of a new Bishop and the 
office is held for a defined period of time.  The judicial vicar and his assistants must be of unimpaired reputation 
and must hold a doctorate or minimum of licentiates in Canon Law. 
173
 Canons 129 and 1421. Since 1971 lay persons may be appointed as Judges in matrimonial cases.  Power is in 
the College of the Church by Divine Institution, not in the persons.  Sole judges must be clerics so a layperson 
will only form part of the college.  
174
 A judge, Promoter, Defender or Auditor cannot act as a judge in another instance of the same case, cannot act 
in cases where they might have an interest, affinity or friendship.  The Bishop deals with objections against the 
judge and all other officials 
175
 Canon 1428. 
176
 Canons 1430-1436 
177
 Ibid. Defender or Promoter roles can be held at the same time by the same person but not in the same case.  
Both roles require the minimum if a licentiate if not a doctorate.   
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 The Notary (who must be present during each procedure. The procedure Is null and 
void if not signed by the notary)
178
  
 Advocates (whose duty is the discovery, ascertainment and legal assertion of truth and 
objective fact),
179
 and  
 Pro-Curators (who may be involved in cases but not as members of the tribunal: they 
represent parties).
180
  
Diocesan courts are almost exclusively occupied with matrimonial cases – the adjudication of 
the validity of marriages.
181
 With papal approval dioceses can group together and operate a 
single court for that diocesan group.
182
  In the case of inter-diocesan tribunals, the group of 
bishops or a bishop designated by them has all the powers of the diocesan bishop. The 
National Tribunal for Wales (our case study) provides an example of an inter-diocesan 
tribunal.  There is also only one tribunal in Scotland.  In contrast, in England, every diocese 
has its own diocesan court.  There is an elaborate system of rights of appeal.
183
  There are 
four levels of Church tribunals: Diocesan; Metropolitan (at the level of the Archdiocese); 
Regional and the Holy See.
184
 
 
The Three Institutions  
Having examined the existence of Jewish, Islamic and Catholic courts in the United 
Kingdom, this section seeks to explore the three selected case studies in further depth, 
focusing upon their organisational structure.  
 
The Beth Din in London  
The formal title of the London Beth Din is the „Beth Din of London and the Country‟. This 
denotes the institution‟s national role, which has become increasingly important in recent 
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 Compare the Church of England where the busiest courts are those exercising faculty jurisdiction concerning 
church property: N Doe, The Legal Framework of the Church of England: A Critical Study in a Comparative 
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 See, e.g., N Doe, The Legal Framework of the Church of England: A Critical Study in a Comparative 
Context  (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1996) 151.  
184
 The Roman Rota serves as an appeal court and the Apostolic Signatura serves as a supervisory court. See 
Canons 1442-1145. 
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times because of the decline in the size of Jewish communities and local Batei Din in 
Britain.
185
  The London Beth Din is situated in a building owned by the United Synagogue in 
North London. The building includes a „court room‟ which is not dissimilar to a modern 
county court room.  The room is lined with floor-to-ceiling bookcases covered by glass doors 
and containing large, hard-backed Hebrew volumes, the legal texts referred to by the 
Dayanim during hearings.   At the top of the room the floor level is slightly raised (a step up) 
and contains a long table behind which are three chairs, the one in the centre a grand and 
large leather chair and on either side two smaller office chairs.  In the centre of the room 
(lower level) is a conference table which can be split into smaller tables as required 
surrounded by eight office chairs. 
 
The Beth Din performs a variety of different functions.  The staff are asked and answer a 
variety of different questions concerning daily ritual and practice.  The Kashrut Division of 
the Beth Din is the leading UK authority on Jewish Dietary Laws.
186
   The work of the 
London Beth Din sitting as a Beth Din is fourfold:  the Beth Din is involved with questions 
concerning Jewish status,
187
 conversion,
188
 divorce
189
 and arbitration.
190
  In terms of its 
marriage jurisdiction, it deals with approximately 110 cases a year.   Divorce constitutes 
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 See <http://www.theus.org.uk/the_united_synagogue/the_london_beth_din/about_us/> 
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 Ritual slaughter is a rabbinic rather than a Beth Din function; the Beth Din is a constituent of the Kashrut 
Division of the United Synagogue which licenses caterers, restaurants, factories to certify that all food 
ingredients are kosher.  The Division operates under the aegis of The Court of the Chief Rabbi of the United 
Hebrew Congregations of the Commonwealth.  The London Beth Din is also an authority together with two 
other synagogual bodies of the London Board for Shechita ritual slaughter. It is also a Kashrut authority which 
gives licences for bakers, caterers and manufacturers and restaurant owners. 
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 The London Beth Din does the majority of Orthodox conversions in Great Britain. Conversion has to be 
carried out through a Beth Din.  The process is that the applicant studies Judaism for 1-2 years, takes part in 
formal lessons, is seen at regular periods (every 6 months) by a Dayan, lives within a Jewish family and learns 
ritual practice.  The act of conversion requires circumcision for a male and for both males and females 
immersion in a ritual bath in the presence of three Dayanim. It has to take place in the presence of the Beth Din 
and also requires certification by the Beth Din.  
188
 Jewish status is a fact, to be born of a Jewish mother.  The question for this area of the Beth Din‟s work is 
whether the individual in question is Jewish or whether they will require a conversion.  Status is important for 
synagogue membership and marriage. The Beth Din is not now directly involved with Jewish schools given that 
most admission policies do not hinge upon the question of being Jewish – which is a question of Jewish law. In  
R (on the application of E) v JFS Governing Body [2009] UKSC 15 the majority of the Supreme Court held that 
an admissions policy which defined Jewishness in accordance with the teaching of the Office of the Chief Rabbi 
was a test of ethnicity and was therefore unlawful.  
189
 Discussed below. 
190
 It arbitration function involves it settling civil cases between private individuals or institutions in accordance 
with Jewish law.  The arbitration function of the court mainly deals with family disputes, financial disputes, 
partnership disputes, employment cases and inheritance.  In terms of family disputes, the Beth Din‟s operation 
as an arbitrator covers disputes about ownership or the use of property but not about divorce. In this capacity, 
the Beth Din operates under the Arbitration Act 1996.   
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about twenty percent of the Beth Din‟s activities.  The Beth Din sits three times a week 
throughout the year.  
 
Although the London Beth Din is known as the Court of the Chief Rabbi, the Chief Rabbi is 
not personally involved in its day to day running. The Beth Din itself has no written 
constitution and is now a division of the United Synagogue. Its functions are spelt out as a 
matter of law in the contracts of the Dayanim. There are currently three full time Dayanim 
and one part-time Dayan.
191
 There is also an administrator of the Beth Din who advises the 
Dayanim on English law and who runs the initial stages of the arbitration process and who 
liaises with the United Synagogue and the Chief Rabbi.  There are also three clerical staff and 
a Rabbi and a secretary who work on conversion clerical work for one and a half days a 
week.  The staff are employed and funded by the United Synagogue. All of the Dayanim are 
Rabbis.
192
  
 
The Dayanim spend a significant amount of time answering questions by Rabbis and lay 
people. These questions tend to relate to matters concerning daily ritual and practice.  Their 
answers to these questions are not necessarily classified as responsa.  An answer only 
becomes a responsum when it is written down, widely displayed and generally accepted.  
Some questions are relevant only to particular individuals and different answers may be given 
to similar questions depending upon the facts. In this role the Dayanim do not sit together as a 
Beth Din, but work individually in their own private offices. The Dayanim sometimes 
provide informal meditation or advise that parties approach the Jewish Marriage Council.  
The Dayanim regularly consult the authorities found in the room but in divorce cases this is 
usually only in relation to matters of spelling.
193
   Some prior cases handled in the Beth Din 
are persuasive but are not binding precedents as such. Lack of agreement is rare but is more 
common in the arbitration jurisdiction where questions of fact as well as law arise.  Oaths are 
rarely taken.  Witnesses are not required in order to corroborate evidence.
194
  There is no 
appeal.  
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 A Dayan (the singular form of „Dayanim‟) literally means „judge‟ in Hebrew. 
192
 The Dayanim possess formal qualifications in Jewish law required from recognised Orthodox institutions.   
193
 See further below. They may seek opinions from other Batei Din (mainly in Israel). 
194
 See below for a discussion of the presence of witnesses as part of the get process.  
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The Shariah Council of the Birmingham Central Mosque 
The Shariah Council and the Family Support Service share a meeting room at the 
Birmingham Central Mosque. This meeting room is furnished in a modern style with desks,  
computers and filing cabinets and obviously functions as a working office.  There is a notice 
on the door of the room which details times at which the office was open for enquiries.  On 
one side of the longest desk in the meeting room there are larger high backed  office chairs 
and on the other side of the desk smaller, office chairs.   
 
The Shariah Council has been operating for approximately ten years. It was originally set up 
as a personal initiative of the current chairman of the Mosque which was approved by the 
Central Mosque‟s Council of Management.195  The Council provides rulings, guidance and 
advice on range of issues including inheritance and requests to learn more about Islam.
196
  
About ninety percent of the Council‟s time is spent dealing with marital issues. The Council 
attracts parties from far and wide.   
 
Parties are originally dealt with by the Family Support Service. Two members of staff (both 
part time) are responsible for sifting the material or doing the preliminary work and when 
they reach a conclusion that the marriage is not viable or that the parties are insistent on 
separation or termination of the marriage the case is then put to the Shariah Council. They 
operate according to an unwritten code of practice.  These functions have been delegated to 
the Family Support Service by the Shariah Council.  The Shariah Council itself has four 
members, all of whom are volunteers. The panel is chaired by the chairman of the Mosque 
who is the fourth member. The members of the Council are chosen by the chairman of the 
Mosque on the basis of their knowledge of the Qur‟an and Sunnah and also to ensure that the 
Council membership reflects different backgrounds.
197
 
 
The Shariah Council meets monthly, usually for about three to four hours at a time.   
Each case takes around five to six minutes since the preliminary work of testing whether the 
marriage is saveable has been done by the Family Support Service.  They also give advice to 
the parties if there is anything which they notice that the parties should have taken into 
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 The Council of Management is elected every year and any major changes require the consent or sanction of 
the Council of Management. 
196
 Council members are approached on matters such as conversion.  Questions concerning status are dealt with 
by the chairman of the Mosque. 
197
 In particular, the chairman of the Mosque is keen to select members who are not bound by a particular school 
of thought. No formal qualifications are necessary.   
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account before they got married; in particular, they advise applicants who had not registered 
their marriages under civil law to do this next time . The Council deals with around 150 cases 
a year. The Council works by consensus or by majority decision in the rare case of there 
being a dissenting voice.  No reasons for decisions are given.  Prior decisions are not 
understood as constituting binding precedents.  The parties sometimes swear an oath and 
occasionally they bring a representative with them.   People other than the parties are 
occasionally called to give evidence, including children.  The Council has not called any 
expert witnesses to date. Parties may take their case to another Shariah Council if they are 
unhappy with the Council‟s decision.198 
 
The National Tribunal for Wales in Cardiff  
Unlike the other two case studies, the National Tribunal for Wales does not have its own 
court room or building. Its headquarters are the House of the Archbishop in Cardiff where all 
archives are held.  The proceedings could take place here but the Judicial Vicar has decided 
that they should be held in his parish Presbytery, elsewhere in Cardiff.  
 
The National Tribunal for Wales was formed in 2007 following Vatican approval of a Decree 
of Erection which was jointly published by the Bishops of the three dioceses in Wales (which 
includes part of Herefordshire). Prior to this, Cardiff had formed a joint tribunal with West 
Wales. The main motivation for forming the National Tribunal for Wales was the desirability 
of pooling personnel.  Since the Decree of Erection does not stipulate that the tribunal is a 
marriage tribunal, it could therefore possibly have a wider scope.  Conventionally the 
diocesan court exercises the Bishop‟s judicial powers on his behalf.199  However, in practice, 
all of the National Tribunal‟s work has concerned its marriage jurisdiction.  
 
The Archbishop of Cardiff is the Moderator of the National Tribunal.  The tribunal is headed 
by the Judicial Vicar who is responsible for assigning the work and supervising the running 
                                                 
198
 Other Councils may come back to the original Council to verify any evidence and the Council‟s original 
decisions. 
199
 This means that the Tribunal could determine a number of rights and duties under canon law. This could 
include status disputes between parishioners and their priests and other parochial disputes. However, in practice 
these tend to be resolved parochially. The same is true of disputes concerning finances and „temporal goods‟.  
(Here there is a tension between canon law and the law of England and Wales: whereas under canon law, the 
parish owns its own property, under charity law, the diocese is the owner.)  The Tribunal could also determine 
disputes arising in church schools concerning the religious character of the school. The Tribunal would have no 
role in relation to admissions.   Canon law also prescribes a recommended system of penalties for crimes.  This 
means that the tribunal could be involved in imposing penalties for matters such as child abuse.  The tribunal 
could impose these penalties unless the crime involved a Bishop in which case it would be dealt with by Rome. 
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of the tribunal.   The appointment of the officers is a matter for the Moderator.  The National 
Tribunal also has an Administrator
200
 who ensures that the law and the procedure that the 
Judicial Vicar has put in place are followed. The Administrator deals with most of the 
correspondence and the initial applications. It is the Judicial Vicar, however, who decides 
whether to take the case on. Both the Judicial Vicar and the Administrator are also parish 
priests. Strictly, they should have Vatican approved qualifications in canon law.
201
 There are 
also two associate judicial vicars, one for each of the other two dioceses.  There are six other 
potential judges and other personnel who fulfil the roles required under canon law such as 
Defender of the Bond, the Promoter of Justice, the Notary and Advocates.
202
  The Tribunal 
has no designated secretarial staff.   
 
There is no „hearing‟ as such; instead the parties are interviewed separately and given an 
explanation of the procedure. The parties never physically meet. The interview may take 
place in at the party‟s own home or at the Presbytery of the interviewer.  The interviews of 
parties and witnesses are written up and are presented to the tribunal, together with pleadings 
by the advocate (if appointed) and defender of the bond. Expert witnesses may be sought by 
the judicial vicar.
203
  All parties swear oaths.  The panel (of three) then sits in the parish 
Presbytery.
204
 Decisions are reached by majority and reasons are given.
205
 A judge can write 
a dissenting opinion which is added to the case file. The National Tribunal draws on 
commentaries as well as the Code of Canon Law
206
 and regards its own decisions and  rulings 
from Rome as persuasive but not binding.
207  Although the Code of Canon Law states that all 
                                                 
200
 Note that this title does not derive from the Code of Canon Law.  
201
 That is, a doctorate from Rome, Ottawa or Leuven Universities. However, those who have alternative 
qualifications may seek a dispensation from the Apostolic Signatura an application for a dispensation requires 
the candidate to submit some of their academic work for review.  Dispensations are now granted for periods of 
three years only. In order for members of the laity to undertake roles such as Defender of the Bond they have to 
provide character references which document their active involvement in the Church community. 
202
 See above.  
203
 In some cases expert witnesses are obligatory.  
204
 A sole judge can decide upon a case but this requires a dispensation from Rome and any appeal regarding the 
judgment made must be heard by a panel of three. 
205
 Where three judges form a tribunal one is the Ponens (sentence writer).  The decision of each judge is not 
included in the written sentence only the final judgment.  
206
 Most notably Dignitas Connubi which expands on the Canons, provides a fuller explanation and brings 
common procedures together. Articles found in legal journals and opinions of eminent Canonists are also 
persuasive.   
207
 However, Doe has argued that whilst theoretically there is no system of precedent in the Catholic courts, in 
practice some form of precedent system does exist: N Doe, “Canonical Doctrines of Judicial Precedent: A 
comparative study” (1994) 54 The Jurist 205-215. 
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pastoral means should be tried to resolve a situation,
208
 pastoral care is left to the parish 
clergy. This is largely because the Tribunal will not grant an annulment unless the parties 
have been divorced in civil law. If the tribunal finds that the marriage is void then the case
209
 
is automatically passed for review to the tribunal of second instance which, in the case of 
Wales, is Birmingham.
210
   
 
Their Jurisdiction in respect of Marriage and Divorce  
This section provides a general outline of the jurisdiction each of the institutions has in 
relation to marriage and divorce, with particular reference to the process followed and the 
type of termination provided.
211
  
 
The Beth Din in London  
The Beth Din may occasionally, but rarely, rule on validity, but primarily deals with divorces. 
Its role is supervisory. The role of the Beth Din is to ensure that the parties divorce each other 
correctly and that the get document itself is properly drawn up. Except very rarely, the Beth 
Din does not judge or declare the marriage to be terminated. Usually there is no „ruling‟ or 
judgment that the marriage has broken down, because, as with a marriage, the parties make or 
end the contract themselves. The function of the Beth Din is simply to witness the parties‟ 
mutual divorce and ensure, for the purposes of future remarriage and the status of future 
offspring of the parties within the religion, that the writing of the get document which 
signifies the divorce, and the procedure of handing it from the husband (or his representative) 
to the wife, is conducted correctly.
 212
 
 
A Decree Absolute under civil law is required before the get certificate is issued, though the 
get process itself can be completed before. The position is slightly complicated because of the 
provision under civil divorce law to delay the pronouncement of the decree absolute in 
                                                 
208
 Canon 1676 provides that: „Before he accepts a case and whenever there appears to be hope of success, the 
judge is to use pastoral means to persuade the spouses that, if it is possible, they should perhaps validate their 
marriage and resume their conjugal life‟. 
209
 The Case File will contain any dissenting opinions by the judges at first instance.  
210
 The 2
nd
 instance judges will not add their arguments to the case file but will issue a decree of ratification (or 
non-ratification) for the decree of nullity issued by the tribunal of first instance.  Competence to act as a tribunal 
of second instance is granted by Rome. 
211
 The following does not go into the substantive details of the rules of the different religious faiths for 
terminating the marriage or declaring it void. 
212
 For a consideration of whether the Beth Din could take a more pro-active approach, see B Jackson, Agunah: 
The Manchester Analysis (Deborah Charles Publishing, forthcoming 2011,). 
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relation to these. As noted earlier in Part One of this commentary, the provision
213
 provides 
that either spouse may apply to the court for an order that a decree absolute may not be 
granted „until a declaration made by both parties that they have taken such steps as are 
required to dissolve the marriage in accordance with [the usages of the Jews or any other 
prescribed religious usages] is produced to the court‟. 
 
The process falls into two stages.
214
 During the first stage, each spouse sees a Dayan 
separately to discuss their wish to end the marriage.  The get process itself occurs during the 
second stage.  For this stage, the parties are called back to the Beth Din on a separate 
occasion, and may attend together, or commonly, separately. If the case is straightforward, a 
single Dayan presides. The Dayan explains the procedure. The husband must annul any vows 
he may have taken not to give a get and demonstrate that he is now giving the get of his own 
free will.  A Scribe and two appointed Witnesses
215
 are present whom the Husband instructs 
to write and sign the get. The get is then written.
216
 The Dayan checks that the process has 
been fulfilled correctly and then the husband, or his representative (again appointed by the 
Beth Din), hands the get to the wife declaring that she is divorced from the husband. These 
proceedings are not held in public.
217
  The fee is £695 or £495 for members of the United 
Synagogue. 
 
The Shariah Council of the Birmingham Central Mosque 
Over half of the cases dealt with by the Shariah Council that we studied involved couples 
who were not married under English civil law. The Council must be satisfied there are valid 
grounds for declaring the marriage over, based on evidence submitted by the applicant and in 
light of any conflicting evidence from the other spouse.   
 
Given that the husband may unilaterally divorce his wife under Islamic law, it is not 
surprising that applicants are almost always wives. For the Shariah Council that we studied, 
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 Enacted by the Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act 2002 and now contained in s 10A of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973. 
214
 The Beth Din interviewees were keen not to see them as proceedings on the basis that fault is not being 
attributed. 
215
 The „witnesses‟ are not witnesses to what has gone wrong with the marriage in the way that they would be in 
the other tribunals, but witnesses to the giving and receiving of the get. 
216
 The scribe writes the Get by hand which takes between one and two hours to do.  After this time, the parties 
return to the room and are given the Get.  
217
 The parties do not have to meet each other, but the Beth Din may appoint a representative for the husband, 
who hands the get to him, and he then – possibly several weeks later -  hands it to the wife.  
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the focus effectively is on determining whether the marriage is no longer workable and, as we 
have seen, there is a mandatory mediation stage prior to a ruling being given to see if the 
marriage can be saved. In essence, the Council looks to see if the marriage can be terminated 
by means of a talaq or khul (that is, by getting the husband to divorce the wife, or to agree to 
her divorcing him) and if not, it will then look for grounds to fit the circumstances of the 
case. Proof that the marriage is not workable any more is based on grounds which may 
include fault factors. Where a civil divorce has been obtained, this in itself will be taken as 
proof of irretrievable breakdown and as obviating the need for a religious divorce to be 
pronounced. Those who have entered into a civil marriage are expected to have obtained a 
civil divorce before seeking an Islamic divorce.  
 
The process is threefold. First, as we have noted, the applicant or both parties will have been 
seen by the Family Support Service. The advisers there compile a report for the Shariah 
Council setting out the basis for the case.  Secondly, three letters are sent out at monthly 
intervals inviting the husband to appear.
218
 Commonly, the husband does not appear. The 
case proceeds once the three letters have been sent. The approach is adversarial insofar as the 
Council is dependent upon the case and evidence presented to it by the applicant (and 
respondent if he appears). The Council has no facilities to call its own witnesses.  The final 
stage is when the case goes to the Shariah Council itself.
219
  In the hearing itself, the parties 
may be represented by a solicitor, but this is very rare; more usually, an applicant may be 
represented by a relative (usually male) or will represent herself and may be accompanied by 
a relatives or friends.  If, which is rare, the husband appears at the hearing, he and the wife 
are not heard within the Council itself at the same time, but sequentially – and so they do not 
have the opportunity to hear and comment directly, much less cross-examine, on what each 
other or any witnesses said. Nor are they necessarily informed of what the other might be 
saying or writing about them. The fee is £150. 
 
The National Tribunal for Wales in Cardiff  
The Roman Catholic Church may issue „dispensations‟, „dissolutions‟ and „annulments‟. The 
focus of this commentary is on the last of these, as the National Tribunal is directly 
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 Where the applicant has had a civil divorce then only one letter will go to the other party as a courtesy.  
Where there has not been a civil divorce (usually because the marriage was not registered under civil law), the 
three letters are sent out by recorded delivery to try to ensure that the person has received notice of the 
proceedings.   
219
 Not all cases go to the Shariah Council, as sometimes people just go to the family support service for advice. 
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concerned only with annulments.  Its approach is inquisitorial:  the Tribunal must be satisfied 
there are grounds to annul the marriage.  In essence, the Tribunal is concerned with whether 
there was a true consent between the parties at the time of the marriage. This may be 
established by evidence relating to incapacity
220
 and several other grounds.
221
 The National 
Tribunal will not deal with an application for annulment until the civil divorce has been 
obtained. 
 
The process falls into four stages. First, the applicant will approach his or her parish priest for 
advice (and at this stage the priest will typically explore the scope for reconciliation). The 
priest may ask the Advocate to speak to the applicant to give some advice, or may simply 
refer him or her to the Tribunal. The second stage consists of the initial application to the 
tribunal and an informal interview. The Tribunal Administrator sends the applicant a 
preliminary enquiry form to get some basic information about the spouses, and then the 
instructing judge or an „auditor‟222 interviews the applicant with a view to establishing 
whether or not „there is a case to answer‟.223 Similarly, the respondent (if they choose to take 
part) will be interviewed and both parties may name witnesses to be interviewed by the 
tribunal. Cases may be dropped at this stage in light of the view taken by the Tribunal on the 
chances of success.  The Tribunal is not limited to deciding on the case or evidence submitted 
by the parties but may proactively seek evidence, including from independent experts, on say, 
mental capacity: However, it does not seem that the applicant (or other party) is invited to 
challenge such evidence.  This gathering of evidence constitutes the third stage. The fourth 
stage is the meeting of the tribunal itself.  The tribunal
224
 considers all the information and 
opinions that have been produced to reach its verdict, which it does in private without the 
parties being there.  The fee is £450 but may be reduced on a discretionary basis. 
 
                                                 
220
 For example, consanguinity, age, prior marriage, lack of mental capacity. 
221
 Including evidence that the person suffers „from a grave lack of discretionary judgement concerning the 
essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted‟ (Canon 1095.1.2), or „who, 
because of causes of a psychological nature, [is] unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage‟ (Canon 
1095.1.3).  It is also interesting to note the concept of „simulation‟, set out in Canon 1096.1: „For matrimonial 
consent to exist, it is necessary that the contracting parties be at least not ignorant of the fact that marriage is a 
permanent partnership between a man and a woman, ordered to the procreation of children through some form 
of sexual cooperation‟. 
222
 A priest nominated to carry out the task. 
223
 The interview with the instructing judge or auditor is the only direct contact the applicant will have with the 
panel . Even where an Advocate is appointed, he does not interview the petitioner but comments on the case that 
he or she has put forward. 
224
 As explained above, the default position is that three judges should be present.  However, some cases can be 
heard by one qualified judge. 
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Part Three: Key Findings 
 
Introduction 
This part sets out the key findings from the project.  The three case studies should not be 
considered to be „typical‟ or „representative‟ of Jewish, Christian or Islamic tribunals in 
general. Moreover, since our empirical investigation consisted mainly of interviews with 
tribunal personnel, it is important to note that the data collected derives from the perspective 
of the tribunal rather than of the users.
225
 The focus of the project was to compare the work of 
tribunals of different religions and how they relate to the law of the State.   
 
The findings are organised in three sections.  The first examines the organisation and 
operation of the tribunals in the study. The second part examines their jurisdiction in relation 
to marriage, nullity and divorce. The third and final section reflects upon the relationship 
between the tribunals and societal/civil law expectations. 
 
The Tribunals, their Structure and Sources of Authority 
 
Diversity within Faiths 
There is no monolithic community representing the entire body within any of the three faiths 
we studied. Even the much greater homogeneity of the Roman Catholic Church is influenced 
by its local cultural and social contexts.  The Catholic Church in Africa may well approach 
the practice of the religion differently from the Church in the USA or in Wales.  And within 
both Islam and Judaism, there are several degrees of orthodoxy and versions of interpretation.  
 
Similarly, there is a multiplicity of religious tribunals within the different communities in 
terms of the basis of their authority and adherence by those using these tribunals. Different 
communities within these faiths may have their own religious tribunals ruling on matters 
relevant to their adherents.   
 
 
 
                                                 
225
 There is very limited empirical research in relation to users, and this appears to be confined to shariah 
councils: see S Shah-Kazemi, Untying the Knot: : Muslim Women, Divorce and the Shariah (Nuffield 
Foundation, 2001) and S Bano, „Islamic Family Arbitration, Justice and Human Rights in Britain‟, (2007) 1 
Law, Social Justice & Global Development Journal http://www.go.warwick.ac.uk/elj/lgd/2007_1/bano 
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Forum Shopping 
There is no „hierarchy‟ of tribunals within the Jewish and Muslim communities, and no 
appeal structure. This has led to an interesting element of „forum shopping‟ by litigants. The 
absence of a hierarchy in the Muslim and Jewish communities means that litigants can, to 
some extent, choose which tribunal they go to according to the way in which (they think) the 
law will be applied to them or by what they perceive will be the extent of recognition of the 
tribunal‟s decision across their community.  While a party cannot appeal against an adverse 
decision, it is apparently open to a Jewish or Muslim person to make use of a different 
religious tribunal if they are not satisfied the first time. 
 
This is more likely in the Muslim community, by virtue of the lack of any structural linkages 
between mosques according to the religious school of thought that they follow. For Jewish 
people, the rulings handed down by the more liberal wings of Judaism would not be 
recognised in the orthodox communities, so those who belong to such wings might still 
choose to make use of a more orthodox Beth Din in order to secure broader recognition.   
 
The Catholic Tribunal is in a different position being part of a hierarchical appeal structure 
which derives its authority from Rome.  However, there is still an element of „choice‟ here in 
the form of choosing whether to pursue a remedy through the Tribunal. Indeed, it would 
appear that the parish priest may exercise a significant role in advising whether individuals 
ought to go to the Tribunal.     
 
Flexibility in use of Sources of Law and Authority  
Each religious tribunal applies a body of religious „law‟ in the sense of a set of norms that are 
binding on adherents. However, the particular Shariah Council studied in this project appears 
to take a very flexible approach.  It told us that it did not represent any single school of 
thought but rather drew on different schools of thought to arrive at what it regards as just and 
fair decisions.  There is no system of „precedent‟ which constrains its decision-making.  
 
This is also true of the Beth Din, which will look to a range of opinions and rulings from 
other batei din in reaching its judgments but again, as there is no hierarchy of tribunals, it is 
not bound by any prior ruling.  However, the particular role that the Beth Din plays in 
relation to divorce limits the scope for variation in any event, since Jewish divorce law as 
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interpreted by this Beth Din is focused squarely on witnessing the parties‟ consent to divorce 
and is not governed by „grounds‟. 
 
The Catholic Tribunal draws on commentaries as well as the Code of Canon Law and regards 
its own decisions and  rulings from Rome as persuasive but not binding.  This flexibility as to 
sources of law is common to all of the institutions we studied. The autonomous position of 
the particular tribunal, and/or the breadth of the rules which might be applied to the case 
before it, provides a degree of flexibility to the decision-maker.  The institutions we studied 
seem to be using religious law in practical ways to meet real needs. 
 
Interaction of Religious and Legal Roles 
A commonality between all the Tribunals in relation to staffing is the degree to which their 
operation rests upon volunteers and the services of those who usually have other professional 
religious roles within their communities.  There is clearly a fusion of religious and legal roles. 
Personnel in all three tribunals are seen as sources of guidance and advice outside the judicial 
process.  Their authority may derive from their position in the tribunal, their standing in the 
community or their own personality. 
 
None of the tribunals studied has a „legal status‟ in the sense of „recognition‟ by the state. 
They derive their authority from their religious affiliation, not from the state, and that 
authority extends only to those who choose to submit to them. However, as far as 
marriage/divorce is concerned, they are not „arbitrators‟.  Their authority to rule on the 
validity/termination of a marriage does not derive from the parties‟ agreement to submit their 
„dispute‟ to them (indeed, there may be no dispute) in the same way as an arbitration clause 
in a contract (for which the Beth Din and some Shariah tribunals would also qualify to rule 
on civil disputes). Rather, adherents to the particular faith must make use of the religious 
tribunal if they are to obtain sanction to remarry within their faith.  
 
Marriage, Annulment and Divorce 
 
Grounds for Termination 
All three religions see marriage as based fundamentally on the volition of the parties. For 
Muslims and Jews, marriage is therefore a contract, to be ended at the parties‟ will. For 
Catholics, marriage is a sacrament as well as a contract, but the focus on a true consent as the 
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basis for annulment reflects the same understanding of the essence of marriage as the other 
faiths.  
 
The basis for the ending of the marriage varies as between the three tribunals. For the Shariah 
Council, the focus is on determining whether the marriage is no longer workable, and there is 
a mandatory mediation stage prior to a ruling being given to see if the marriage can be saved. 
It could be said that the Shariah Council has a view of the process closest to the basis of 
current English divorce law as both focus on whether the marriage has „irretrievably broken 
down‟.  
 
For the Beth Din, no grounds need be proved, and there is no „ruling‟ or judgment that the 
marriage has broken down. The function of the Beth Din is (in almost all cases) simply to 
witness the parties‟ mutual divorce and ensure, for the purposes of future remarriage and the 
status of future offspring of the parties within the religion, that the writing of the get 
document which signifies the divorce, and the procedure of handing it from husband to wife, 
are conducted correctly. 
 
For the National Tribunal, the grounds for annulment are related to whether there was a true 
consent between the parties, which may be established by evidence drawn from events during 
the marriage itself. In this regard, some of the grounds come closer to what English law 
would see as voidable, rather than void, marriages, or even facts which would present as 
establishing irretrievable breakdown for the purposes of divorce.  
 
A Licence to Remarry 
The fundamental rationale for the grant of the religious annulment/divorce is to enable the 
parties to remarry within the faith. The focus is on the marriage itself, not the ancillaries 
(children, money and property) and reminds us that ultimately, a dissolution or annulment is a 
licence to remarry. For adherents, being able to remarry within the faith serves both to enable 
them to remain within their faith community and to regularise their position with the religious 
authorities. This is particularly crucial in the Jewish religion, because the failure to obtain a 
get will jeopardise the legitimate status of the wife‟s future children and descendants.  
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Procedure 
Process and procedure vary as between the three tribunals, reflecting the different approach to 
the role that each takes. For the Beth Din, there is no investigation by the tribunal into the 
parties‟ reasons for seeking a get. If there appears to be a possibility that the parties are not 
sure that they wish to divorce, they will be encouraged to seek counselling, but this is not part 
of the tribunal‟s function itself. Rather, the function is to supervise and witness the parties‟ 
mutual agreement that the marriage should end.  
 
For the Shariah Council, a mediation stage is a mandatory preliminary step in the process.  
This is not mediation in the sense now understood in the English family justice system, which 
focuses on encouraging the parties to reach agreement on the consequences of the divorce. 
Rather, the focus is actually on reconciliation. If the applicant still wishes to proceed after 
mediation, the role of the Council is to ensure the marriage is unworkable and it will listen to 
the parties‟ evidence, and hear their witnesses, to arrive at its decision. The process at this 
stage is primarily adversarial in that the Council is in the hands of the parties as to what 
information is put forward to it and how arguments are presented.  
 
The National Tribunal adopts a more proactive and inquisitorial approach in the sense that 
there are different individuals appointed within the process to investigate the marriage from 
different perspectives – in particular, the „Defender of the Bond‟ explores the potential for 
upholding the validity of the marriage and the tribunal may seek evidence from its own 
witnesses, including independent experts.   
 
None of the tribunals operates the kind of hearing common in the English civil courts 
(although not in the divorce court where most divorces are undefended and handled without 
any oral hearing) whereby both parties hear and may cross-examine on the evidence brought 
by the other. For the Beth Din, this is not applicable given the nature of the get process. For 
the National Tribunal and the Shariah Council, the parties are seen separately, although in the 
case of the Shariah Council, they might both be physically present on the same day for the 
Council to deal with their case.  
 
All three religious tribunals are clearly aware of the emotional dimension to the process of 
ending a marriage and seek to recognise this by their procedures. Indeed, it might be argued 
that keeping the parties apart rather than hearing them at the same time is a way of doing this 
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by reducing the potential for hurtful exchanges. While the Beth Din process is formal and 
bound by the rules regarding the writing of the get and its handing over, it provides „helpers‟ 
to support women, and the handing over may be done by a representative rather than the 
husband in person. The Shariah Council appears to adopt a very informal atmosphere. The 
Catholic Tribunal, while bound by the canons, keeps the taking of evidence relatively 
informal by holding interviews with the parties and witnesses in their own localities and 
again, avoiding a „hearing‟. All three religious tribunals also recognise an important pastoral 
role in the process, either through informal advice and counselling or by encouraging parties 
to consult outside bodies or their own priest/rabbi/imam.  
 
Limited Role in Relation to the ‘Ancillaries’ 
„Ancillary‟ matters are those relating to the consequences of the ending of the marriage in 
relation to arrangements for the parties‟ children, or money and property. The National 
Tribunal has no role in relation to dealing with such consequences. Under Jewish law, it is 
possible for the parties to agree at the time of the marriage a) that they will agree to a get and 
b) that they will ask the Beth Din to resolve any ancillary disputes. Such agreements would 
not amount to binding arbitration contracts, since the jurisdiction of the civil courts on such 
matters may not be ousted by the parties‟ agreement (Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s 34; 
Children Act 1989 s 10) and in such cases, they are advised to seek a consent order in the 
family courts. The Shariah Council similarly advises parties to make use of the civil courts to 
resolve disputes, in recognition that it cannot give legally binding rulings. However, it may 
advise the parties on what should be done with mahr (dower).  
 
The Relationship between the Tribunals and Societal/Civil Law Expectations 
 
Interaction between Civil and Religious Law 
Each of the institutions firmly recognises and supports the ultimate authority of civil law 
processes when it comes to marriage and divorce.  All three institutions encourage the parties 
to obtain a civil divorce, if applicable, before seeking a religious termination. Indeed, the 
Catholic Tribunal does not deal with an application for annulment until this has been done, 
and the Beth Din will not provide the certificate that a get has been given until it has proof of 
the civil divorce. Both the Beth Din and the Shariah Council regard the obtaining of a civil 
divorce as clear evidence of the parties‟ view that the marriage is over, and for the Shariah 
Council, this is conclusive, such that it does not deem it necessary to grant a religious divorce 
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to enable the parties to remarry under Islamic law (although it will do so to reflect the parties‟ 
wishes for „recognition‟ by the Council of the ending of their marriage).   
 
The Beth Din considers that if the husband will not agree to a divorce, then under Jewish law, 
it has no means to compel him to do so. In such a case, the wife is known as a „chained wife‟, 
or agunah. Section 10A of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, inserted by the Divorce 
(Religious Marriages) Act 2002, is intended to assist the wife by enabling the civil tribunal to 
withhold the grant of a decree absolute until the get has been obtained. This remedy is 
ineffective if the husband does not himself wish to be able to remarry under civil law since he 
is indifferent to whether a civil divorce is granted or not. The London Beth Din considers, 
however, that the legislation has reduced the number of agunot.  
 
The Place of the Religious Tribunal within the wider Society 
None of the three tribunals seeks greater „recognition‟ by the state and all clearly recognise 
the boundaries between what they do, and the sphere of the civil courts. It is worth noting that 
the Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act 2002 does not „recognise‟ Jewish divorce, but merely 
withholds the civil decree absolute in order to prompt the obtaining of such a divorce.  
 
None of the tribunals has any legal status afforded to them by the state or the civil law, and 
their rulings and determinations in relation to marital status have no civil recognition either. 
They derive their authority from their religious affiliation, not from the state, and that 
authority extends only to those who choose to submit to them.  
 
Providing a Service for the Faith Community  
All of the institutions studied see their work as a religious duty.  They regard themselves as 
providing important mechanisms for the organisation of community affairs and the fulfilment 
of community need.  The structural framework, organisation, resourcing, and staffing of each 
of the tribunals in many ways reflect the history, economic resources, and social development 
of the communities they serve.  The Beth Din, Shariah Council and Catholic Tribunal, 
provide an important service for those Jews, Muslims and Catholics for whom a religious 
divorce „in the sight of God‟ is important from both a spiritual and religious legal perspective.  
 
